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Abstract
Highly indebted developing economies commonly also hold large external reserves.
This behavior seems puzzling given that governments in these countries borrow with
an interest rate penalty to compensate lenders for default risk. Reducing debt to the
same extent as reserves would maintain net liabilities constant while decreasing in-
terest payments. However, holding reserves can have insurance benefits in a financial
crisis. To rationalize the levels of international reserves and external debt observed in
the data, a standard dynamic model of equilibrium default is extended to include dis-
tortionary taxation and debt restructuring. This paper shows that fiscal adjustments
induced by sovereign default can generate large demand for reserves if taxation is dis-
tortionary. At the same time, a non-negligible position in reserves modifies the debt
restructuring negotiations upon default. A calibrated version of the model produces
recovery rate schedules that are increasing with reserves, as seen in the data, being
also able to replicate large positions of reserves and debt to GDP. Finally, I study
how both mechanisms play a key quantitative role to generate such result, in fact, not
including them, produces a counterfactual demand for reserves that is close to zero.
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1 Introduction
International reserves are important policy tools in developing economies. A clear pat-
tern from the data shows that many countries decide to hold large positions of international
reserves while, at the same time, maintain high levels of external debts. This observation
has intrigued economists that raised questions about the optimal management of inter-
national reserves. Holding reserves while keeping positive debt levels entails a cost when
borrowing interest rates are larger than the interest rate earned on foreign assets. For
instance, by the end of 2005, governments of emerging economies held on average more
that 15% of GDP in foreign reserves, while external debts were on excess of 33% of GDP.
This behavior, not exclusive to a few Asian countries, seems to be more general and in-
cludes also Latin American countries (figure 1). Departing from this observation, Rodrik
(2006) estimated that these countries incur, annually, in an average GDP loss of 1% for
maintaining a choice of high debt and reserves. Others have however argued that this cost
is outweighed by the benefit that reserves provide as an insurance instrument against the
occurrence of financial crisis (Feldstein, 1999). This paper deals with the question of why
developing economies hold simultaneously large amounts of debt and reserves, and what
kind of financial crises are more prone to induce such choice.
To analyze the above question, this paper adds four new features to the sovereign default
model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). First, reserves accumulation is explicitly modeled by
allowing the sovereign government to choose a portfolio of external debt and international
reserves. Second, the government is assumed to raise revenue using distortionary taxa-
tion. Third, the model includes a sudden stop shock, defined as a complete impediment
to borrow. That is, if the economy is hit by a sudden stop shock, the sovereign cannot
borrow in the current period and has to repay its debt or default. This feature of the model
intends to reinforce the role of financial crises at generating positive demand of reserves for
precautionary motives. Fourth, a renegotiation stage is assumed to occur after a sovereign
defaults. By allowing for endogenous renegotiation between lenders and the government,
the model adequately accounts for realistic debt reductions observed in the data. Addition-
ally, if international reserves affect the sovereign value of regaining access to international
markets, then different levels of reserves will imply different recovery rates for the lenders,
thus providing another channel influencing demand for international reserves.
The model economy works as follows. A government from a small open economy chooses
distortionary taxes, international reserves and external debt in order to finance public ex-
penditure and maximize households welfare. Households supply labor to firms that pro-
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Figure 1: International reserves and external debt accumulation for Latin American coun-
tries in 2005
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duce final consumption goods subjected to productivity shocks. However, wages earned
by households are taxed by the government. Due to limited commitment in international
credit markets, lenders cannot oblige governments to repay and therefore supply credit with
an interest rate spread that reflect the risk of default. If the government decides to default,
domestic productivity suffers a loss and access to credit markets is temporarily barred until
debt is restructured. Additionally, if the economy is hit by a sudden stop shock, interna-
tional lenders loose faith in the government credit for exogenous reasons. If that happens,
the government has two options: either adjust consumption by repaying all outstanding
debt, or default and bear the associated losses.
Given a positive probability of default, the interest rate spread for debt will be positive.
Therefore, an impatient government, desiring to shift consumption from the future to the
present by taking debt, will face a large cost of carrying positive amounts of risk free interest
paying reserves. Reducing simultaneously debt and reserves increases current consumption
as the interest rate on reserves is lower than the interest rate on debt while keeping the
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level of net debt constant. Given this cost, it seems unreasonable for a government to
hold any debt at all if reserves have no other purpose. However, a choice of no reserves
makes the economy more exposed to sudden stops. If the economy is hit by a sudden stop,
the government is forced to adjust consumption either by repaying debt or defaulting. In
this case, reserves can be used to repay debt, helping the government to prevent a sharp
adjustment in consumption and even a default event. The larger the costs associated with
the impact of a financial crisis, the more the insurance provided by reserves1. On one hand,
pro-cyclical taxation, especially recurrent in developing economies (Gavin and Perotti, 1997;
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2005), aggravates such costs as higher taxes distorts output
further more. On the other hand, if a government defaults, then current reserves are
used during debt restructuring negotiations, thus affecting the recovery rate that lenders
face. Because reserves provide limited benefits when the government is permanently in
autarky, recovery rates will be positively related with the level of reserves. This mechanism
provides an additional channel over which a positive level of reserves provides benefits to
impatient governments: lenders will transmit an expected higher recovery rate to lower
interest rate spreads. To summarize, reserves provide two main benefits to the government:
an insurance benefit arising from a precautionary motif and a decrease in interest rate from
the renegotiation channel.
Using the model outlined above, this paper goal is to explain non-trivial levels of reserve
and debt to output ratios while verifying other features from the data at the business cycle
frequency. The focus on a short-term analysis is related with the fact that international
reserves seem to be actively managed by governments during crisis periods. Broner, Didier,
Erce, and Schmukler (2011) documents dynamics related to debt and reserve accumulation
around times of financial crisis in emerging market economies, namely, that gross capital
inflows and outflows are correlated and both collapse around crisis. Additionally, this paper
also documents a positive association of international reservers and recovery rates using a
dataset compiled by Benjamin and Wright (2009) on default episodes and debt restructur-
ing. These two empirical regularities are analyzed by computing a numerical solution for
the model outlined above. The resulting simulations are then used to generate moments
that are compared against Mexican data. The reasons for the choice of this country as a
benchmark to evaluate the model relate to the fact that: Mexico is representative of emerg-
ing market economies in the sense that its debt and reserves dynamics resemble figure 1;
1Recent empirical evidence finds that international reserves reduce the likelihood that a country is hit
negatively by global adverse effects, for example, Frankel and Saravelos (2012) or Bussière, Cheng, Chinn,
and Lisack (2014).
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and this economy experienced several financial crisis in the last 30 years.
Link with the literature
This paper is related with the literature of sovereign default of small open economies,
where the classical work is Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). In that paper, the authors present a
small open economy dynamic model with non-contingent debt and lack of full commitment
that generates equilibrium default. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) show the quantitative
relevance of that model in replicating key business cycle statistics for emerging market
economies, in particular, pro-cyclical dynamics of net capital inflows. In a related paper,
Arellano (2008) uses a non-linear output loss in the event of a default (increasing in the
endowment realization) to generate similar results but with a higher default rate as is, in
fact, closer to what is observed in the data. Using a model similar to Eaton and Gersovitz,
Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) study directly reserve and debt accumulation by small open
economies, concluding that reserves play no role as insurance instruments. Two main
reasons explain why they find such result. First, a proportional output loss is assumed
as the penalty faced by economies that default. As a result, a substantially low discount
factor has to be used in order to generate realistic debt to GDP holdings. With such a
lower discount factor, savings becomes almost prohibited in the model. Second, the only
risk faced by borrowers in their model is endowment fluctuations. In that case, reserves
provide a bad hedge against that risk: market exclusion becomes more bearable when the
government holds reserves, thus increasing the spread charged by lenders.
Alternatively, the model presented in this paper uses an output loss similar to Arellano
(2008), and adds a sudden stop shock2. Ranciere and Jeanne (2006) provides an early
model where reserves play a direct role in providing insurance against sudden stops when
the country has positive debt holdings. In that paper, a sudden stop is modeled as a
persistent event that, on top of the exclusion from markets, entails a output losses on
its own. More recently, Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2012) use the same idea to
generate positive demand for reserves in a model of the Eaton and Gersovitz type with
long-term debt. Contrary to those papers, the sudden stop shock version used in this paper
does not impact the country in any other way, but in a temporary lack of credit access,
similarly to the sudden stop shock proposed in Roch and Uhlig, 2012. Additionally, this
paper includes endogenous renegotiation and distortionary taxation to the model. Yue
(2010) studies the interaction between sovereign default and ex post debt renegotiation,
2A term first used in Calvo (1998).
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concluding that recovery rates are decreasing with the level of debt. Detragiache (1996)
and Aizenman and Marion (2004), using simple two-period models, have argued that costly
taxation might play an important role in generating demand for reserves when the country
faces default risk. Under such circumstances governments would want to prevent not just
the direct effect of an output loss generated by a default event, but also the costs of raising
revenues when taxation is particularly costly. More recently, Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza
(2010) underline that distortionary taxation becomes especially relevant in an environment
of limited risk sharing due to the presence of default. In their model, tax rates increase
when output is low, consistent with evidence that developing economies tend to maintain
pro-cyclical fiscal policies (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2005;
Vegh and Vuletin, 2012; Bauducco and Caprioli, 2014).
This paper contributes to the literature by providing a framework for studying the
dynamics of reserves, debt, and sovereign spreads. Moreover, the results points to the
importance of distortionary taxation and debt restructuring for a realistic quantification
of the demand for reserves. To my best knowledge, this paper is the first that can deliver
realistic results regarding debt and reserves using a model with one-period debt.
Main Results
As a preview of the results presented in later sections, the model used in this paper is
quantitatively able to replicate some data moments of the business cycle statistics, such as
large debt holdings, default rates, negative co-movement of trade balance and output, and
positive correlation between gross capital outflows and inflows. Additionally, strong reserve
accumulation is also generated in the simulations. This result contrasts the findings from
Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009). The reason why this emerges as a result is related with the
fact that, under the proposed model, losses of default are painful enough to generate a large
insurance role for reserves. Of key importance to this result is the extension of the baseline
model to include debt restructuring and costly fiscal collection. Quantitative results from
computing and calibrating the model indicate that the baseline model can generate 10%
international reserves to GDP as seen in the data for Mexico. If fiscal distortions are
shutdown from the model, then only 5% reserves to GDP are sustained in equilibrium, and,
if renegotiation is not allowed, only 0.4% reserves to GDP are generated.
The remaining paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 identifies the main trends in the
data and shows empirical relationships between reserves and relevant variables. Section 3
presents the model and defines the equilibrium. Section 4 justifies the functional forms, cal-
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ibration and analyzes the simulation results. Section 5 concludes the paper. The numerical
procedure and alternative model specifications are relegated into appendices in A.
2 Empirical Evidence
This paper is mostly concerned with the accumulation of international reserves and
external debts. For that purpose, international reserves are defined as external assets held
by a country’s government or central bank. According to the guidelines of the International
Financial Statistics (IFS), compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these assets
“comprise holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members
held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange”, in which should be included, “foreign
banknotes, bank deposits, treasury bills, short- and long-term government securities”. As
such, most assets considered as reserves are highly liquid and yielding interest close to
the risk free rate. It should be noted however that assets managed by sovereign wealth
funds, typically yielding higher returns, are not considered international reserves. Different
management principles dictate the dynamics of such funds, often characterized by the seek
of higher yields or strategic value, and, for that reason, fall outside the scope of this study.
In its turn, external debts are defined by the IFS as “external obligations of public
debtors, including the national government, political subdivisions (or an agency of either),
and autonomous public bodies, and external obligations of private debtors that are guar-
anteed for repayment by a public entity”3. Because this paper focus on the implications of
debt default on risk sharing, the debt considered is that owned directly or indirectly by a
government, that is by an agent with the option to repudiate it.
Additional details, definitions and sources for all variables used in this paper can be
found in appendix A.1.
What are the costs of holding international reserves?
Part of the reason why a choice of large debt and reserves is intriguing relates with the
cost of maintaining such portfolio. As an example, consider a situation where the borrowing
interest rate equals i and the savings interest rate i∗. In this case, iND is the cost of holding
ND of debt without any reserves. An equal net debt holding can be achieved by borrowing
D = ND+R and, at the same time, saving R. The total interest cost of this choice would
3Due to data limitations from the World Development Indicators, public and privately owned external
short-term debt are indistinguishable and will be included in the measures of debt used in this paper
without distinction.
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be i(ND+R) while i∗R would be the revenue from earned interest. Thus, the cost difference
between these two financing options amounts to (i− i∗)R, that is, if the borrowing interest
rate is higher than the saving interest rate, holding debt and reserves carries a cost equal
to the interest rate difference (spread) times the level of reserves.
Figure 2: Debt in selected emerging market economies in 2000
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Figure 3: Spreads in selected emerging market economies
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Table 1: Crude estimates of costs of holding reserves for selected countries (in % of annual
GDP)
year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Argentine 0.59 0.84 5.90 6.08 6.70 4.11 0.51 0.57 1.20 1.87 0.98
Brazil 0.37 0.58 1.03 0.75 0.43 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.35 0.45 0.27
Ecuador 1.85 0.61 0.51 0.43 0.31 0.37 0.24 0.47 0.91 1.34 0.36
Mexico 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.34 0.21
Peru 0.92 1.09 1.05 0.72 0.64 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.66 0.74 0.48
Philippines 0.96 1.21 0.91 0.93 0.81 0.72 0.44 0.40 0.69 0.89 0.64
Turkey 0.43 0.90 0.93 0.74 0.34 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.38 0.45 0.26
Venezuela 1.18 0.91 1.36 2.50 1.21 0.85 0.44 0.48 1.13 1.32 0.81
mean 0.81 0.79 1.49 1.54 1.32 0.88 0.31 0.36 0.69 0.93 0.50
This example is closely related with the trends observed in emerging market economies.
Figure 2 illustrates this fact by showing both levels of external debt and international
reserves for a group of selected countries. External debt varies between 15 and 60% of
GDP, while international reserves between 5 and 20%. With a positive spread between
the interest rate on debt relative to reserves, such gap becomes costly. In fact, due to
prevalent sovereign debt crisis in emerging market countries, spreads have been large as
international investors take into account default risk (see figure 3). Spreads4 are generally
quite volatile and high, reaching magnitudes of 20% and larger, even in non-default episode
periods5. With these facts, a crude estimate on the annual cost of holding reserves can be
built as being the simple product of the spreads and international reserves. Table 1 shows
the calculations: costs can be substantial, oscillating on average between a range of 0.31 to
1.54% annual GDP6. Rodrik (2006), using different assumptions, also estimates substantial
costs that can be larger than 1% of GDP.
4Spreads are given by a secondary market rate, computed by JPMorgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index
(EMBI). These spreads are measured by an index that includes sovereign and quasi-sovereign (guaranteed by
the sovereign) instruments that satisfy certain liquidity criteria in their trading. All spreads are calculated
as the premium paid by an emerging market economy over a U.S. government bond with comparable
maturity.
5The extreme interest rate spread spikes observed in Argentina and Ecuador coincide with default
episodes.
6The range changes to 0.28-0.9% annual GDP if Argentina is excluded.
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International reserves impact on interest rate spreads
Given non-negligible costs of holding reserves, one could argue that there must be coun-
terweight benefits to rationalize the observed levels of reserves. This section explores po-
tential benefits of holding international reserves through their influence on interest rate
spreads. To evaluate empirically the relationship between spreads and international re-
serves, this study follows a long literature of regressing spreads on covariates7. All variables
and sources are described in appendix A.1. Our evidence is based on large panel regressions
controlling for country and time effects using annual data. Periods of default and market
exclusion are not considered for the analysis. Table 2 reports the results from 3 different
commonly used econometric specifications.
All three specifications are consistent at showing that reserves to GDP are negatively
associated with spreads while controlling for other variables8. As for external debt to GDP,
the coefficients across regressions have the opposite sign. These results maintain statistical
significance even after controlling for country and time effects. The fixed effects column in
table 2 shows that an increase of 10pp of reserves to GDP is associated with an average
fall of spreads in the order of 36 basis points or 0.36%. At the same time a 10pp increase
of debt to GDP or fall in real GDP of 10% is associated with an increase of spreads of
29 and 60 basis points respectively. The regression coefficients for the remaining controls
have the expected signs, for example, countries under worse budget condition have larger
spreads, or economies with better institutions, measured from a rule of law index, tend to
be associated with lower spreads. These results update and are consistent with previous
empirical studies. For the purpose of this paper, the main message is that international
reserves seem to be negatively related with interest rates charged to countries that seek
external financing. Such effect can be seen as a benefit to hold international reserves.
7For example Edwards (1984), Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) or Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer
(2009).
8To deal with potential sources of contemporaneous endogeneity with spreads, lagged variables were
used for: reserves/GDP, debt/GDP, real GDP growth rate, revenues/GDP, expenditures/GDP, inflation
and current account to GDP.
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Table 2: Effects of international reserves on spreads (dependent variable: annual mean
spread in basis points)
Pooled OLS Random Effects Fixed effects
L.reserves to gdp (%) -2.52∗∗ -3.78∗∗ -3.56∗
(0.67) (1.38) (1.85)
L.debt to gdp (%) 2.12∗∗ 2.49∗∗ 2.86∗∗
(0.44) (0.68) (0.8)
L.rgdp growth rate (%) -1.71 -5.39∗ -6.04∗∗
(3.48) (2.75) (2.8)
L.revenues to gdp (%) -10.78∗∗ -11.37 -9.69
(3.61) (7.43) (9.89)
L.expenditures to gdp (%) 11.56∗∗ 12.16∗∗ 13.22∗∗
(3.86) (5.43) (5.87)
L.inflation (%) 9.17∗∗ 6.75∗∗ 6.69∗∗
(2.91) (1.41) (1.49)
L.current account to gdp (%) 1.50 -3.29 -5.84∗
(1.89) (2.85) (3.16)
Openness -0.15 0.04 0.08
(0.3) (0.66) (1.03)
Contagion 0.12 0.17∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Rule of law -298.53∗∗ -322.16∗∗ -351.26∗∗
(43.71) (64.44) (78.19)
Urban population -0.56 -0.21 9.84
(0.83) (1.71) (9.17)
constant 454.16∗∗ 65.49 -539.27
(107.82) (145.51) (610.42)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 304 304 304
R2 0.59 0.56 0.36
International reserves and haircuts
Rational investors lending to a country should price the interest rate taking into account
the probability of repayment and, in case of a default, the expected recovery rate of the
overdue debt. Previous empirical studies on the determinants of interest rate spreads, for
example Edwards (1984) or Akitoby and Stratmann (2008), assume that such expected
recovery rate is zero, implying that regression coefficients similar to the ones presented
in table 2 could be directly mapped into default probabilities. However, with non-zero
11
expected recovery rates, these coefficients may confound two different effects of the related
variable: the probability of default and the expected recovery rate. This implies that a more
complete analysis of the relationship of reserves on spreads should also take into account
how recovery rates relate with reserves.
Figure 4: Haircuts on default episodes for middle income countries
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To better study how recovery rates or, using a different term, haircuts - defined as the
complement of the recovery rate - I use a dataset on historical haircuts associated with
sovereign default episodes compiled by Benjamin and Wright (2009). These estimates have
become commonly used in the literature studying restructuring of sovereign defaulted debt9.
Figure 4 shows how haircuts relate with lagged reserves, debt and GDP growth rate. The
picture suggests a negative relationship between haircuts and reserves, that is, the higher
the level the reserves, the larger is the recovery rate on the defaulted debt. At the same time,
countries with larger debt to GDP tend to have large haircuts and GDP growth rate doesn’t
seem to matter much for haircuts. Simple multivariate regression techniques10 presented in
table 3 confirm that observation, showing a negative and statistically significant coefficient
for lagged reserves even after controlling for lagged debt or output growth: a 10pp increase
in lagged reserves to GDP is associated with 16pp fall in debt haircuts.
9Examples include Yue (2010) and Erasmo (2008), where the first studies how haircuts change with the
level of debt, and the second studies how haircuts are related with delays in restructuring.
10More elaborate regression techniques, exploring the panel structure of the data, were not used due to
small number of default observations per country.
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Table 3: Effects of international reserves on spreads (dependent variable: haircut in % of
overdue debt)
Haircut OLS I OLS II OLS III
L.reserves to gdp (%) -1.17∗∗ -1.6∗∗ -1.6∗∗
L.debt to gdp (%) 0.30∗∗ 0.31∗∗
L.rgdp growth rate (%) 0.46
Constant 44.76 34.68 32.84
Observations 58 51 51
R2 0.06 0.23 0.23
3 Model
In light of the evidence presented in the previous sections, a model economy is introduced
in this section where the optimal choice of reserves depends on the tradeoff between the cost
of holding reserves, closely related with interest rate spread, and the benefits of holding
reserves, linked to 3 different factors: smoothing the impact of a crisis on consumption,
minimizing fiscal distortions on production, and change the negotiation position in default
episodes. These last 2 benefits represent the main innovation that is introduced relatively
to previous models from the literature. In proceeding this way, the model allows for a better
accounting of the observed dynamics regarding debt and reserves.
The model economy11 builds up from the classical work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981),
with recent applications in, among others, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008).
A small open economy is populated with a representative household, a firm and a govern-
ment. The household is ’hand-to-mouth’, simply consuming any income net of taxes earned
in each period, that is, they never own any asset whatsoever. This assumption mutes domes-
tic credit markets to highlight the role of external debt and international reserves markets.
The firm buys labor to produce final goods with a production function that is subjected
to diminishing returns and to a multiplicative technology shock. The government acts on
behalf of the household by making decisions about the amount of debt and reserves to hold,
both available in international markets. It also taxes consumers in order to finance public
expenditures which, for the sake of simplicity, are exogenous. Due to limited commitment
in the enforcement of debt contracts, the government can default on its own debt. Under
such scenario, access to international markets is temporarily shut down and a renegotiation
11A simple version of this model with some implications is introduced in the appendix A.2.
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process follows. While excluded, firms suffer a loss in productivity and lenders recover part
of the repudiated debt by allowing the government to regain access to the market. Addi-
tionally, in any time period, lenders can loose confidence in debtors for exogenous reasons.
A sudden stop then echoes as an impediment to the renewal of the government’s loans.
3.1 Household
An infinite lived representative household values lifetime consumption and labor accord-
ingly to:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht) (1)
where E is the expectation operator, β denotes the discount factor, and the period
utility u : R+ × [0, 1] → R is: continuous, differentiable and concave in both arguments;
increasing in c and decreasing in h.
The household supplies labor to the firm at a wage rate wt, taxed at a rate τt. No
savings are allowed and profits pit are transferred as lump sum. Income thus earned is used
for consumption, yielding the following time t budget constrain:
ct = (1− τt)wtht + pit (2)
Optimal household behavior regarding consumption and hours supply can therefore be
characterized by equation (2) and the following first order condition:
− uh(ct, ht)
uc(ct, ht)
= (1− τt)wt (3)
3.2 Firm
The firm in the economy maximizes profits by using labor ht in a production technology
subjected to diminishing returns f(ht) and random productivity shocks zt. The function
f : [0, 1]→ R is continuous, differentiable, concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. The
productivity shock zt evolves accordingly to a Markov process. Profits in time t are given
by
pit = ztf(ht)− wtht (4)
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Which imply the following labor demand condition:
wt = ztfh(ht) (5)
3.3 Government
Acting on the household’s behalf, the government with a good credit history has the
ability to borrow or save in international markets. Due to incompleteness of financial
markets, the government can only borrow by selling non-contingent one period bonds Dt.
At the same time, it can also choose to save by buying international reserves Rt. To finance
public expenditures gt, it can also tax wages. If the government decides to repudiate its own
debt, credit history becomes bad with further exclusion from international credit markets.
In this situation, firms productivity becomes z˜t = zt− l(zt), where l(zt) is a continuous loss
function such that 0 ≤ l(zt) ≤ zt. Putting all elements together, the government budget
constraint in period t is given by:
τtwtht = gt +Dt − qtDt+1 −Rt + q¯Rt+1 if good credit history (6)
τtwtht = gt −Rt + q¯Rt+1 otherwise (7)
where qt is the price of new debt and q¯ the risk-free price of new international reserves.
3.4 International investors
International investors provide debt and reserve assets to the government. However, the
economy can suffer a random sudden stop shock denoted by s. Similarly to Roch and Uhlig
(2012), s is interpreted as a “crisis” sunspot where, for extraneous reasons, the government
looses access to international markets12. In this model the sudden shock realization is
independent from all other variables, taking the value s = 1 if the economy is hit or s = 0
if it’s not. If the economy is in a sudden stop, no international investor provides credit
to the economy. This is equivalent as stating that the price of new debt equals zero. If
instead the economy is not in a sudden stop, international investors price debt so that, in
expectation, their profits are zero. In the event of a default, it is assumed that they recover
an amount ϕ˜(D,R, z) ∈ [0, D] of the arrears debt in the period following renegotiation.
Note that under this case, the recovery rate schedule is given by ϕ˜(D,R, z)/D. Letting
12For a model where sunspots can generate large shifts in the borrowing conditions see Cole and Kehoe
(2000).
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Z˜(D,R, z) be an indicator function taking 1 if the government defaults and 0 otherwise,
new debt becomes priced as:
q(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt, st) =
0 if st = 1q(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt) otherwise (8)
where
q(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt) = q¯ ·
{ˆ [
1− Z˜(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt+1)
]
dF (zt+1, st+1|zt, st)
+
ˆ
Z˜(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt+1) · q¯ ϕ˜(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt+1)
Dt+1
dF (zt+1, st+1|zt, st)
}
(9)
and it is assumed that (zt, st) evolve according to the transition probability given by
F (zt+1, st+1|zt, st). From the definition of (8), the price schedule is bounded by qt ∈ [0, q¯],
in other words, interest rate on borrowing is always equal or larger than the risk free rate.
3.5 Timing
The events characterizing this model can be structured with the following order. At the
beginning of period t, a government with good credit history:
1. Starts with debt and reserves levels of Dt and Rt respectively.
2. Sudden stop and productivity shocks are realized: st and zt.
3. The government decides whether or not to default.
(a) If the government decides not to default:
i. Choses Dt+1, and Rt+1 at prices q(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt, st) and q¯. The remaining
variables (ct, ht, τt, wt, pit) are determined by the model’s agents13.
ii. Advances to period t + 1 with a good credit history and debt and reserves
levels of Dt+1 and Rt+1.
(b) If the government decides do default:
13Note that when Dt+1 and Rt+1 are chosen, τt is uniquely determined from equations (3), (5), (6) and
(7).
16
i. The country enters in financial autarky. The government still chooses Rt+1
and the remaining variables (ct, ht, τt, wt, pit) are determined by the model’s
agents. At the same time, the government negotiates how to restructure its
debts with lenders, agreeing to pay ϕ˜(Dt, Rt, zt) next period.
ii. Advances to period t+ 1 still with bad credit history. The government pays
ϕ(Dt, Rt, zt) and decides on Rt+2. The remaining variables are determined
(ct, ht, τt, wt, pit) by the model agents.
iii. Advances to period t + 2 with a good credit history, no debt, and reserves
level of Rt+2.
Given that the focus of this paper is not in the study of delays in debt restructuring, it is
assumed in the model that restructuring is exogenously resolved in the period that follows
a default. In this framework, the government must negotiate a debt restructuring with
lenders when it defaults and, in the next period, transfer the agreed amount. Despite
being restrictive, this environment generates results that are similar to the ones obtained
in models of renegotiation such as Yue (2010) or Erasmo (2008) where agents choose to
renegotiate very quickly, even though they are specifically allowed to delay repayments or
renegotiations.
For convenience, the timing of the model is also schematized in figure 5.
Figure 5: Sequence of events of the model
(Dt, Rt, zt, st)
good credit history
DEFAULT
choose Rt+1
restructure ϕ(Dt, Rt, zt)
market exclusion
(Rt+1, zt+1)
repay and choose Rt+2
market exclusion
(Dt+2 = 0, Rt+2, zt+2, st+2)
good credit history
REPAY choose {Dt+1, Rt+1}
(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt+1, st+1)
good credit history
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3.6 Recursive formulation of the problem
The government problem consists in maximizing consumers utility given by (1) subject
to all the constraints summarized in equations (2) to (8). Let vrep be the value for a
government who repays its debt, vdef the value of a government who defaults and (D,R, z, s)
state variables. Then the previous problem can be represented recursively as:
vrep(D,R, z, s) = max
D′,R′
{
u(c, h) + βEz,s
[
max
{
vrep(D′, R′, z′, s′), vdef (D′, R′, z′)
}]}
(10)
st
c = zf(h)− g −D + qD′ +R− q¯R′ (11)
− uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= zfh(h)− g +D − qD
′ −R + q¯R′
h
(12)
The first constraint (11), resulting from combining equations (2) and (4)-(6), is a resources
constraint: private and public consumption equate to the sum of domestic production plus
net external inflows, whether positives or negatives. The second constraint (12), which
combines (2)-(6), is a labor market equilibrium condition. That is, it represents the set
of competitive allocations (c, h) such that both consumers and firms are optimizing given
prices and taxes. Note also that, under this representation, tax rate is no longer explicitly
present in the equations. This is because they are determined by the next period choice of
debt and reserves. As such, the government’s problem collapses into choosing the level of
reserves and debt for next period subject to both resources and labor market constraints.
Note however that given an allocation (c∗, h∗, D′∗, R′∗) that is a solution for (10), tax rates
can be recovered from equations (3) and (5):
(1− τ) = −uh(c
∗, h∗)
uc(c∗, h∗)
· 1
zfh(h∗)
If, instead, the government decides not to repay, it spends one additional period in
financial autarky that will be used to reach an agreement with its creditors. Given these
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elements, the government’s value of default can be defined as:
vdef (D,R, z) = max
R′
{
u(c, h) + Ez
[
max
R′′
{βu(c′) + βEz′vrep(0, R′′, z′′, 0)}
]}
(13)
st
c = z˜(z)f(h)− g +R− q¯R′
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= z˜(z)fh(h)− g −R + q¯R
′
h
c′ = z˜(z′)f(h′)− g +R′ − q¯R′′ − ϕ˜(D,R, z)
uh(c
′, h′)
uc(c′, h′)
= z˜(z′)f ′h(c
′, h′)− g −R
′ + q¯R′′
h′
R
′ ≤ R
The first and second pair of equations represent the resources constraints in the first and
second period, before the government is readmitted in international credit markets. In the
first period of default, the government suffers a productivity loss z˜(z) and agrees to repay
ϕ˜(D,R, z) to his creditors in the next period. Here, I assume that in order to regain access
to international markets, the government has first to repay his agreed debt. Note that the
last constrain imposes that the government cannot increase reserves while in autarky. This
assumption prevents the government from accumulating too much reserves in the period
preceding restructuring. A more complete model with a longer and uncertain period of
market exclusion would not require to have such constraint.
3.7 Renegotiation
As in Yue (2010), if the government defaults and becomes excluded of international
markets, then renegotiation follows immediately where borrowers and lenders bargain over
a recovery amount in exchange for access to international credit markets. If negotiations
fail, the government becomes forever excluded of international credit markets. Let vaut(R, z)
be the value of permanent autarky and vrep(0, R, z, s) the value of being in the market with
zero debt. For a government owing D, holding R and with productivity z, reaching an
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agreement for a recovery amount ϕ has a value given by:
ΛG(ϕ;D,R, z) =
max
R′<R
{
u(c, h) + Ez,s
[
max
R′′<R′
{u(c′, h′) + βEz′,s′ [vrep(0, R′′, z′′, s′′)]}
]}
−vaut(R, z)
That is subjected to the following constraints:
c = z˜(z)f(h)− g +R− q¯R′
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= z˜(z)fh(h)− g −R + q¯R
′
h
c′ = z˜(z′)f(h′)− g +R′ − q¯R′′ − ϕ
uh(c
′, h′)
uc(c′, h′)
= z˜(z′)f ′h(h
′)− g −R
′ + q¯R′′
h′
R
′ ≤ R
where z − z˜ = l(z) ≥ 0 represents the output loss of exclusion and the outside option for
the government (permanent autarky) has a value of:
vaut(R, z) = max
R′
{
u(c, h) + βEz
[
vaut(R′, z′)
]}
(14)
st
c = z˜(z)f(h)− g +R− q¯R′ (15)
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= z˜(z)fh(h)− g −R + q¯R
′
h
(16)
Similarly, lenders obtain an agreement value given by:
ΛL(ϕ) = q¯ϕ
This model features a renegotiation stage that is resolved endogenously in a Nash bargaining
problem. For an η bargaining power for the debtor, the recovery amount ϕ that solves such
problem is given by:
ϕ˜(D,R, z) = arg max
0≤ϕ≤D
{[
ΛG(ϕ;D,R, z)
]η · [ΛL(ϕ)]1−η} (17)
20
3.8 Recursive Equilibrium
All elements are now available to define a stationary recursive equilibrium in this model
economy. The equilibrium notion is of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium, that is policy actions
about debt, reserves, default, and negotiation, depend only on pre-determined relevant
variables.
Definition 1. A recursive equilibrium is a set of:
i) Value functions: vdef (D,R, z, s) and vaut(R, z)
ii) Debt price function: q(D′, R′, z, s)
iii) Debt recovery function: ϕ˜(D,R, z)
Such that
a) Given the debt price function q(D′, R′, z, s) and the debt recovery function ϕ˜(D,R, z),
the value function vrep(D,R, z, s) solves the government problem (10)
b) Given the value function vrep(D,R, z, s) and the debt recovery function ϕ˜(D,R, z), the
debt price function q(D′, R′, z, s) is consistent with the lenders zero profit condition in
(8)
c) Given the value functions of repayment vrep(D,R, z, s), autarky vaut(R, z) and the debt
price function q(D′, R′, z, s), the debt recovery function ϕ˜(D,R, z) solves the debt rene-
gotiation problem (17)
4 Calibration and quantitative analysis
To analyze the quantitative properties of the model introduced in the preceding section,
functional forms are chosen and a calibration is proposed for the numerical computation.
The model is used to evaluate the role of international reserves when the debt choice is
endogenous and willingness-to-pay incentives becomes a function of the sovereign’s choices.
21
4.1 Functional forms
The numerical implementation of the model uses a utility function of the form proposed
by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988):
u(c, h) =
1
1− σ ·
(
c− Γ h
1+γ
1 + γ
)1−σ
(18)
This utility function has the advantage of shutting down the wealth effect on labor supply,
therefore shocks in the productivity process have an output response of the same signal14.
Regarding the output level in the event of a default, Arellano (2008) showed that a
non-linear function that induces a disproportionally larger loss if the country defaults in
an expansion is important to allow for a large default probability. Also, large output
contractions at defaults, followed by recoveries (coinciding with credit market re-access)
have been documented, for example, in Yeyati and Panizza (2011). Protracted losses in
output are explained with disruptions of credit flows to the private sector that prevents
normal production (Mendoza and Yue, 2012). As such, a similar functional form is assumed
as appropriate for the productivity under default of the model economy:
z˜(z) =
z if z ≥ zˆzˆ otherwise (19)
The sudden stop shock is added in order to induce the government to hold reserves as
insurance against exogenous shutdowns of credit markets. This idea was firstly introduced
in Ranciere and Jeanne (2006) and applied more recently in Bianchi, Hatchondo, and
Martinez (2012). In those models, governments hold reserves as a buffer not just against
rollover risks, but also against direct output costs that comes along with a sudden stop. This
paper assumes a milder version of a sudden stop shock that does not impact the economy
in any other way but in the momentarily exclusion from credit markets. Additionally, the
sudden stop shock is modeled as being independent and identically distributed in every
period.
Finally, as commonly used in the literature, the productivity process is modeled as a
14This utility function has a long tradition in literature studying business cycles in small open economies,
for instance, Mendoza (1991), Neumeyer and Perri (2005) or Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
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log-normal AR(1), with
log z′ = ρz log z + ′ , ′ ∼ N(0, σz)
This process is discretized into a 21 state Markov chain using Tauchen (1986) method, with
bounds given by log z ∈
[
−3.5 · σz/
√
1− ρ2z; 3.5 · σz/
√
1− ρ2z
]
.
The model is numerically solved using value function iteration. A detailed explanation
of the algorithm and numerical methods used can be found in the appendix A.3.
4.2 Parameters and calibration
The model is computed at a quarterly frequency. Then, the solution is used to evalu-
ate the model’s ability to generate large government’s choices of debt and reserves while
allowing the economy to match other features of the data such as default rates and cyclical
properties of consumption, trade balance, or interest rates. For this exercise, Mexico is used
as reference for the parameter choice. As a representative country from the set of emerging
economies, Mexico has an additional advantage of having available data at a quarterly fre-
quency for a period ranging 1981 to 201215. Moreover, the Mexican economy experienced
a sovereign default episode in 1983 (after a collapse world commodity prices) and a near
default in 1994 (when the country was rescued by IMF and the U.S. Treasury). Mexico has
been displaying also strong dynamics in the accumulation of both debt and reserves: in the
last decade the government more than doubled its holdings reserve to about 10% of GDP
while keeping a debt level to GDP ratio of more than 20%.
All the data referring to Mexico are seasonally adjusted quarterly real series obtained
from OECD, except for external debt and international reserves that are taken from the
World Development Indicators at yearly frequency. Output and private consumption are in
logs and the trade balance is presented as a percentage of GDP. Following the methodology
proposed by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), an effective tax rate is computed for the
Mexican economy16. The interest rate spreads corresponds to the EMBI for 1994–2007 and
all other series are from 1980 to 2010. All series are filtered with a Hodrick–Prescott filter.
15A quarterly times series on Mexico is publicly available byNeumeyer and Perri (2005) for 1981 to 2001
and, for the remaining period, by OECD .
16Appendix A.1 shows how these estimates are computed and specifies data sources.
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Table 4: Parameter values
Value Target
Risk aversion σ 2 Standard in the literature
Inverse Frish elasticity γ 2 Standard in the literature
Risk free debt price q¯ 1/1.017 US interest rate
Probability of sudden stop ω 0.025 Ranciere and Jeanne (2006)
Output elasticity of labor α 0.5 Labour income share in GDP (Mexico)
Productivity shock persistency ρz 0.95 Output volatility and autocorrelation (Mexico)
Productivity shock volatility σz 0.007 Output volatility and autocorrelation (Mexico)
Discount factor β 0.93 Debt/GDP and volatility of trade balance (Mexico)
Productivity cost zˆ 0.96 Debt/GDP and volatility of trade balance (Mexico)
Bargaining power η 0.2 Benjamin and Wright (2009)
Government spending g 0.116 Average government spending to GDP (Mexico)
Disutility of labor Γ 4.66 Average hours of 1/3
Table 4 lists the parameters used in the baseline solution of the model. The table is
divided in a first set of parameters taken directly from the data or the literature, and a
second set that uses the model simulated moments to infer the parameter values. The
two first parameters refer to utility function of the household. The parameter σ, the
risk aversion coefficient, is set to 2 which is a standard value used in the quantitative
macroeconomics literature. The parameter 1/γ is related with the empirical evidence on
the Frish wage elasticity. Given the range of estimates available in the literature (for
example in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman 1988), a value of 0.5 is picked for the
elasticity, that is γ = 2.
In Ranciere and Jeanne (2006), a sudden stop corresponds to episodes when capital
inflows to GDP, measured by the current account, falls by more than 5 percent of GDP
relative to previous year. They then verify that on average 1 sudden stop occurs every 10
years for a set of developing countries. This estimate gives a 2.5% probability of being hit
by a sudden stop, a value that is also used to set ω.
As common in the literature of sovereign default studies, the risk free bond price q¯ is
set to 1/1.017, intended to capture the historical average quarterly1.7% interest rate of a
five-year US treasury bond. As for the parameter α, governing the output elasticity with
respect to output, its value is taken directly from OECD estimates on labor income share
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which averages to 0.5.
The remaining parameters are jointly calibrated to match certain moments of the data.
An observed average 20% of public consumption to GDP is targeted setting g = 0.0116.
Due to lack of enough data on haircuts for Mexico’s default episodes, the haircut average of
42% present Benjamin and Wright (2009) dataset is target instead. This is calibrated with
parameter value of η = 0.2. Both parameters governing the productivity shock are cali-
brated simultaneously as output dynamics are not directly inherited from the productivity
z due to endogenous labor supply. The targeted data moments are the standard deviation
and autocorrelation of GDP given by stdev(GDP ) = 0.026 and corr(GDPt, GDPt−1) = 0.8
with correspondent parameter values of σz = 0.007 and ρz = 0.95. The last 2 parameters
{β, zˆ} are simultaneously calibrated to target the following data moments: mean debt to
GDP and the standard deviation of the trade balance. Debt to GDP is targeted to be 32%
in the simulations and the the standard deviation of the trade balance to 1.4%.
4.3 Simulation results
This section compares the quantitative predictions of the model against observed data.
To that end, a model using table 4 parameters is computed and simulated by averaging the
moments of interest for 1000 sample economies, each one running for 500 periods, where
the first 300 are discarded to reduce the influence of initial conditions. These moments are
computed for 44 periods before a default episode and at least 16 periods after a market
exclusion. Table 5 reports the results of the exercise. The standard deviations referred
in the table are expressed in percentage points; y and c refer to the log of output and
consumption of a de-trended series; Drecover/D is the recovery rate faced by lenders at a
default; the default rate is an annual rate; trade balance TB/Y is defined as the difference
between output and consumption relative to output; D/Y and R/Y are, respectively, the
external debt and international reserve level expressed as a percentage of output; G/Y refers
to government spending to GDP; the annual interest spread is given by ispread = (q/q¯)4−1.
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Table 5: Business cycle statistics for the benchmark model and data
Data Model
mean(D/Y ) 32 34
stdev(TB/Y ) 1.4 1.3
stdev(y) 2.6 2.6
mean(Drecover/D) 58 55
mean(G/Y ) 20 20
mean(R/Y ) 9 10
mean(ispread) 3.0 1.4
stdev(ispread) 1.5 1.3
stdev(c)/stdev(y) 1.2 1.4
corr(y, c) 0.94 0.96
corr(y, ispread) -0.56 -0.26
corr(TB/Y, y) -0.66 -0.66
corr(τ, y) -0.49 -0.81
default rate 2.0 2.8
The first impression of the results is that the model can achieve some success at explain-
ing key features of the data. The model delivers a mean debt to output ratio of 34% while
10% for reserves to output. Large values of debt to output are sustained in equilibrium due
to intense losses in the event of a default. In the present model, default losses are associ-
ated with exogenous losses of productivity given by the function (19) and an endogenous
fiscal adjustment that distorts production severely by reducing labor supply. This is in
contrast with Arellano (2008) that, to target the default rate observed in Argentina, uses
a milder and completely exogenous output loss, ending up with a model that generates a
counterfactually low level of debt to output. When that is the case, lenders became weary
to lend to a country that suffers mildly if it decides to default. Such is not the case in the
current framework. Figure 6, characterizing numerically the typical default event in the
simulations, shows a fall of output of around 15%, accounted by a 4% slump in productivity
and a 11% reduction in hours. From this contraction of output, only 2% are directly caused
by exogenous output loss given by function (19). As the government advances into default,
a debt restructuring negotiation leads to an agreement with international investors that
implies repaying part of the overdue debt. To finance such repayment, the government has
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to raise taxes that distort labor even further, hence generating the described large fall in
output.
Similarly to the result regarding debt, reserves to output also matches the data with an
average level of 10% in the ergodic distribution. In this model reserves play an insurance
role: if the country defaults without any reserves, then consumption has to painfully adjust
by bearing all the losses of default. However, since the probability of default is an endoge-
nous choice for the country, that risk can be reduced by decreasing the debt it chooses to
hold. Additionally, lower debt maps into lower interest rates. This channel would make
reserves less important as an insurance instrument. Note that this is essentially the result
in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009): international reserves cannot be sustained in equilibrium17.
The positive reserve holdings observed in the simulation are related with the additional
risk that the country cannot roll-over debt if hit by a sudden stop. In such scenario, the
government finds it optimal to use reserves to repay debt, avoiding the negative impacts of
a default. If the sudden shock carried further costs to the borrower, then reserves would
play an even more prominent role as an insurance mechanism in this model. In fact, such
costs are present in this model as, to repay the outstanding debt, the government has to
raise distortionary taxes with the effects that are in everything similar to the ones described
before.
Other features of the data captured by this model refer to the negative correlation
between the trade balance and output, and the default rate. Part of the model’s larger than
in the data default rate is accounted by the presence of the sudden stop shock. As shown
in Roch and Uhlig (2012), adding a sudden stop shock with the characteristics presented
in the model, widens the borrowing risky region as now, for certain shock realizations, the
borrower is not able to roll over his debt. This effect increases the number of defaults in
the economy. The result of a negative correlation between trade balance and output of
corr(tb, y) = −0.66 is also obtained in similar papers, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath,
2006 or Yue, 2010. Net capital outflows occur in recessions due to an increase in interest
rates as probability of default increases in recessions. This effect constrains borrowing
endogenously.
Regarding to the mean interest rate spread, the model misses out the data target. The
presence of renegotiation in the model explains why spreads are on average low. This can
be seen from the second term of the right hand side of equation (9) that is non-negative.
17Several features in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) model explain their striking result: in addition to using
a very simple model, without the features presented in the current paper, the authors assume a quarterly
discount factor of 0.5 and a proportional output loss function.
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That is, the presence of a positive recovery rate in the event of a default becomes priced
in new lending with lower spreads18. Other authors have overcome this issue by assuming
a time-varying lender’s discount factor (Arellano, 2008) or a richer specification of the
productivity loss (Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2012). However, for the current investigation,
such anomaly is not corrected due to computational limitations.
One last relevant moment from table 5 is the negative correlation between output and the
tax rate. To capture the fact that fiscal policy in emerging market economies is often pro-
cyclical, the model features an inelastic government expenditure with endogenous taxation.
Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) show that a similar model can generate realistic
pro-cyclical fiscal policies. As output declines, the government with constrained credit
market access has to raises taxes to compensate the smaller base of taxation. The same
idea is also used in this paper to generate distortions in production that are negatively
correlated with output, thus generating more demand for reserves for insurance purposes.
One current limitation of the current model is that government expenditure doesn’t co-
move with output. The main consequence of that assumption is an overestimation of
negative correlation of the tax rate with output. However, as shown in Cuadra, Sanchez,
and Sapriza (2010), making the government expenditure endogenous would still maintain
a negative correlation of taxes and output - at the cost of adding on the computational
burden - without changing qualitatively any of the mechanisms present in this paper.
4.4 Macroeconomic dynamics around an average default episode
For all default episodes meeting the sampling criteria explained in the previous section,
a time window of 12 periods is collected before and after a default occurs. Using this data
sample, a period-by-period average of each variable of interest is computed and the date of
default normalized to 0. These statistics are used to characterize, in figure 6, the dynamics
of the average default episode that the model outlined produces.
18Spreads that are lower than what is observed in the data are usually present in models that display
endogenous negotiation, for instance, Yue, 2010 or Erasmo, 2008.
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Figure 6: Average default episode generated in the model’s simulations
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The top two panels show the dynamic of output and productivity around a default.
The pattern of productivity is the standard in models of sovereign default. At t = 0, the
level of productivity z becomes 2.5% below average19. Note that the depicted productivity
z doesn’t include default costs. At period t = 0 and t = 1 the level of productivity once
those exogenous costs captured by function (19) are taken into account becomes 4.5%. This
translates into a fall of output relative to trend of about 5% in t = 0 and 16% in t = 1.
The relatively mild drop of output in period t = 0, despite the exogenous productivity loss,
is related with the fact that, by defaulting, the sovereign is releasing resources to public
and private consumption and so tax pressure is reduced. However in period t = 1, due to
the agreement reached in the debt restructuring, the sovereign has to transfer the agreed
overdue debt back to investors, increasing taxes in the process.
Both consumption and hours suffers in this joint process of debt restructuring and
fiscal adjustment with the first falling 35% and the later 25% at the trough of the crisis.
As already mentioned in the previous section, these large movements in consumption and
hours are in part inflated by the fact that the government expenditure is exogenous in this
model20. Both aggregates quickly recover once the market exclusion is over, that is, from
period t = 2, 3, ... until the next default.
Also worth noting is the dynamics of reserves to output. Up until period t = −1,
predicting an eminent default, the government maintains his levels of reserves more or less
constant. These reserves are then used in period t = 1 to restructure debt. After period
t = 2, both debt and reserves recover quickly as the cost of holding reserves, given by the
interest spread (bottom left panel), is low for low levels of debt which gets reseted after
regaining market access. However, as debt comes back to normal levels in the following
periods, so does the spreads and demand for reserves falls back to a level close to 10% of
output.
Finally, the right bottom panel in figure 6 shows an average increase of 25pp in the tax
rate during a default episode. While direct tax evidence about labor taxes is difficult to
collect for emerging market economies, using the methodology of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar
(1994), it is possible to construct series on average effective tax rates for OECD countries
that experienced default or near-default crisis in the past: Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Greece.
Inspection of those series confirms that taxes tend to rise around crisis periods, although
19This magnitude corresponds to a 1.2 standard deviation of the underlying shock as stdev(log z) =
σz√
1−ρ2z
= 2.2%.
20As an alternative Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) present a model where both private and public
consumption move together, leading to a less aggressive tax reaction to fluctuations of income.
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not in the same magnitude of what is being generated in the simulation. From equation (6),
it is easy to see that tax rates in this model map into Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007)
definition of a labor wedge. Regarding to financial crisis, Cho and Doblas-Madrid (2013)
finds that labor wedges are major contributors for the observed movements of output. This
implies that in a more loose interpretation of the above model, tax rates can be regarded
as a set of unknown distortions in the labor market induced by the government that are
observed in increasing labor wedges.
4.5 Understanding the mechanism
To better grasp the intuition21 of the results presented in the previous sections, figure
7 depicts the policy functions of the model when the economy is not hit by a sudden stop
in the current period, that is, new debt level D′(D,R, z), reserve holdings R′(D,R, z) and
net debt, simply given by D′(D,R, z)−R′(D,R, z).
Figure 7: Policy functions for new debt, reserves and net debt
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The left panel of the figure shows the policy functions for next period reserves and
debt for fixed current reserves level and productivity shock realization, when current debt
changes, that is: R′(D, R¯, z¯) and D′(D, R¯, z¯) for D ∈ [0, Dmax]. Similarly, the central and
right panel shows the same functions when current reserves or current productivity are
allowed to vary. The first observation is that reserves and debt are correlated and tend
21A simple two-period model developed in the appendix A.2 can be useful to understand the intuition
behind the full model.
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to move together. In particular the right panel shows that gross capital flows, defined
as D′ + R′ are pro-cyclical and tend to collapse in recessions, consistent with empirical
findings of Broner, Didier, Erce, and Schmukler (2011). Additionally, the two panels at
the left shows that lows levels of net debt, represented by the triangles, are associated with
large levels of both debt and reserves. This is because debt implies a low probability of
default and therefore low spreads. But with low spreads, the cost of holding reserves is also
low, and the sovereign has an incentive to accumulate large levels of both debt and reserves.
This is also the reason why in figure 6 reserves and debt tend to recuperate quickly after a
default.
Figure 8: Recovery rate schedules for overdue debt
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Figure 8 plots the equilibrium debt recovery rate schedule as a function of debt and
reserves. Similar to the findings in Yue (2010), debt recovery rate is decreasing with debt
level with a threshold of debt before which recovery rate is 100%. A close inspection of
problem (17) should clarify why the recovery rate schedule has that shape: in the bargaining
problem, the settlement argument from ϕ is independent of the amount defaulted D, so
the recovery rate schedule as a function of D becomes 0 ≤ Rec(D) = max {1, ϕ/D} ≤
1. Intuitively, after defaulting, D becomes ’sunk’ and agents only bargain about future
values that don’t depend on D. That is not the case with R since a marginal unit of
reserves impacts differently the value of renegotiation and the outside value for the sovereign
which amounts to permanent exclusion. This means that different level of reserves implies
different bargaining positions and, therefore, different debt reschedule outcomes. Note that
in financial autarky, the sovereign doesn’t have any additional purpose than to smooth
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consumption in subsequent periods. However, if the decision on restructuring prevails,
anticipating that transfers will be made to lenders, the sovereign will have an additional
incentive to save on top of the previous consumption smoothing motif. But this must mean
that a marginal unit of reserves must be more valuable under restructuring than under
permanent autarky, that is equivalent to say that the total surplus of the Nash bargaining
problem is increasing in R. This argument justifies why the function of the right panel
of the figure is increasing. Intuitively, reserves have more value for a government seeking
credit market access than for a government staying in permanent autarky.
Table 6: Effects of international reserves on haircut (dependent variable: haircut in % of
overdue debt)
Haircut OLS Data OLS Model
L.reserves to gdp (%) -1.6∗∗ -1.4∗∗
L.debt to gdp (%) 0.31∗∗ 0.98∗∗
L.rgdp growth rate (%) 0.46 0.14
Constant 32.84 24.52
Observations 51 51
R2 0.23 0.49
The shapes depicted in figure 8 are consistent with the evidence presented in section
2, figure 4. To better assess how consistent are the debt recovery rate schedules with the
data, the same statistics presented in table 3 are constructed using using data simulated
from the model. The results are presented in table 6 where, for convenience, part of table
3 is replicated. Overall the model performs well at capturing the correlations found in the
data, that is, each additional percentage point of lagged reserves to GDP is associated with
an average fall in the haircut of 1.4pp in the model, while the data generates 1.6pp fall.
Figure 9 shows the debt price schedules for a country with high and low endowment
(left panel) and high and low reserves (right and left panel). The plot in the left shows that
prices are decreasing with debt levels as previously noted in the literature. More debt is
associated with a higher default probability and lower recovery rate, which translates into
higher spreads. Note that the debt price also increases with productivity, thus explaining
why the correlation spread/output in table 5 is negative. When a government receives a
bad shock realization in productivity, an increase in the net debt increases the country’s ex
ante default incentive. A higher default probability and a lower debt recovery rate generate
a higher sovereign debt spread, and thus a negative correlation exists between spreads and
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output. Additionally both panels shows also that more reserves are associated with larger
debt prices. Keeping the debt level constant, larger reserves implies lower net debt, thus
decreasing default probability and, as explained above, a higher debt recovery rate. Both
effects implies that reserves are positively correlated with spreads, also consistent with
regression evidence presented in table 2 from section 2.
Figure 9: Price schedule for new debt as a function of current debt and productivity
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4.6 Sensitive Analysis
The model presented in section 3 adds many non-standard features to the more tra-
ditional models of sovereign default. To try to understand how these features change the
results regarding the simultaneous holdings of debt and reserves, the baseline model is re-
computed shutting down or changing some features to highlight the mechanisms that are
driving the results. In this exercise, the following features are changed:
• Assume that government expenditure are zero: G = 0;
• Assume that there’s lump sum tax policies instead of distortionary: equation (2)
becomes
ct = wtht + pit + Tt
where Tt are lump-sum taxes;
• Assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function (CRRA): equation (18) be-
comes
u(c, h) =
c1−σ
1− σ − Γ ·
h1+γ
1 + γ
;
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• Assume there’s no sudden stops in the economy: ω = 0;
• Assume borrowers have all bargaining power: γ = 1 thus ϕ˜(D,R, z) = 0 ∀D,R, z,
that is, renegotiation is shutdown.
To maintain some comparability between the baseline and the alternative models, only the
volatility of output is targeted by re-calibrating the standard deviation of the innovation
of the productivity process σz. The computed alternative model is simulated to generate
all moments of table 5. However, because the main interest is on the impact of debt and
reserve holdings, only the simulated distributions of the two variables are presented here22
by showing the kernel density estimates of debt and reserves for a bandwidth choice varying
between 0.01 and 0.03. Figure 10 shows the results where the panels at the left represent
the distribution of external debt, while the ones at the right of external reserves; and
the solid lines are for the baseline distributions, while the dashed lines for the alternative
distributions.
The first 4 panels of the picture show very similar results: reducing the level of fiscal
distortions in the model implies an higher level of debt to GDP, but reserves become less
important for the sovereign. Reserves play an important role in the baseline economy as
fiscal adjustments are costly and affect production. Eliminating such distortions reduces
the need for reserves to 3-5%. The next 2 panels study the impact of using a CRRA
utility function instead of the GHH function adopted in the baseline model. Qualitatively,
this alternative doesn’t change much, however, using a CRRA utility function decreases
reserves to about 5% of output. This can be explained by the presence of wealth effects
that dampens the fluctuations in output generated by productivity shocks. That is, with
this utility function labor is not necessarily co-moving with output and this extra degree of
adjustment reduces demand for reserves.
The panels relative to sudden stops show that the presence of such shock is not essential
to generate realistic demand for reserves. As long as the probability of default remains
positive, the important movements of fiscal consolidation and debt restructuring requires
some kind of insurance that can be provided by reserves. Finally the last 2 panel show
the most striking results from this exercise: shutting down renegotiation reduces abruptly
the levels of debt and reserve holding. Under this specification, the model resembles Alfaro
and Kanczuk (2009) in the sense that reserves plays no role in the optimal decision of the
sovereign.
22Complete results for the simulated moments can be found in the appendix A.4.
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Figure 10: Distribution approximations of debt and reserves for different model specifica-
tions
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This result confirms the findings in the previous sections that showed that a substantial
part of the cost associated with a default, resides on debt restructuring. Table 7 summarizes
the findings from the exercise.
Table 7: Simulation results to alternative specification of the model
mean Baseline G = 0 No Distortions CRRA No Sudden Stop No Renegotiation
D/Y 34% 51% 49% 32% 33% 5.4%
R/Y 10% 3% 5% 5% 7% 0.3%
To conclude this section, it is worth mention that part of the simulation results may be
unrelated with the model solution, but to deficiencies in the numerical computation of the
model. A visual inspection of figure7 shows that the policy functions display certain “lumpy”
areas that present due to issues in the numerical precision of the computation. Hatchondo,
Martinez, and Sapriza (2010) studied the quantitative properties of models of sovereign
default and conclude that precision is quite relevant for models that feature high sensitivity
of the bond price to different bond levels. They advise researchers to either use a very fine
grid point for the endowment process or to make the problem continuous by interpolating
the value functions. Neither of those two approaches were used in this paper as the current
model is already harder to compute than most common models: reserves, being an extra
state variable, expands dramatically the problem’s state space; each allocation requires the
solution of a non-linear equation for the labor market; high order interpolation is not easily
implementable as the problem has some defined regions of the state space whose value is
negative infinite, thus, attempts to interpolate such functions leads to the so called Runge’s
phenomena. Future work will attempt to fix these computational issues.
5 Conclusion
This paper studied the extent to which reserves can have an important role as insurance
instruments in a simple model that delivers realistic prediction regarding other dimensions
of the data. Holding positive amounts of reserves is costly as current consumption is reduced
when interest rate spreads are positive. However, reserves can be beneficial if the economy
experiences a financial crisis that forces consumption to adjust abruptly.
A model of equilibrium default augmented with reserve accumulation and sudden stop
shocks is computed and simulated in order to evaluate if the benefits of holding reserves
can compensate the costs. The model is calibrated to generate simulated moments that are
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similar to the ones observed for the Mexican economy. A positive and non-trivial average
reserve to output can be generated while keeping quantitative realistic moments in dimen-
sions such as debt to output, pro-cyclical trade balance, and co-movements of consumption
and output. Reserves play an insurance role by allowing consumption to be smoothed if
the economy defaults or is hit by a sudden stop shock. Default carries substantial adjust-
ments when the government raises taxes in order to accommodate inelastic spendings and
transfers of restructured debt back to lenders. These large penalties of default turn out to
be fundamental in generating realistic demand for reserves: without distortionary taxation
the demand for reserves drops from 10% of GDP to 5%, and without renegotiation they
fall further to close to zero. Moreover, endogenous renegotiation generates a debt recovery
rate that is increasing with reserves and, in turn, affects the government’s ex-ante incentive
to default. In equilibrium, debt is priced to taking into account the risk of default and
restructuring. As such, the model predicts that interest rates and haircuts decrease with
reserves, as observed in the data.
It should be noted that the results obtained abstain from many factors that, most likely,
also influence the demand for reserves. Notably, this paper abstracts from the typical ex-
change rate management explanations (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor, 2010). However,
recent developments in the literature have started to interact exchange-rate policy with
optimal default (Na, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Yue, 2014), thus providing an analytical
framework to integrate international reserves in the analysis. This is a matter to be studied
in future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Sources
The evidence present in section 2 uses the following variable:
Debt to GDP: from the World Development Indicators as the sum of long-term external
debt stocks, public and publicly guaranteed in current US$ (DT.DOD.DPPG.CD)
with short-term external debt stocks in current US$ (DT.DOD.DSTC.CD) divided
by GDP in current US$ (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD) at annual frequency.
Reserves to GDP: from the World Development Indicators as total reserves (includes
gold) incurrent US$ (FI.RES.TOTL.CD) divided by GDP in current US$ (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
at annual frequency.
Spreads: computed as an arithmetic, market-capitalization-weighted average of bond spreads
over US treasury bonds of comparable duration from data collected in J.P.Morgan’s
Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) at monthly frequency.
RGDP growth rate: from the World Development Indicators as the annual percentage
growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG).
Revenues to GDP: from the IMF World Economic Outlook as the general government
revenue as a percent of GDP (GGR_NGDP) at annual frequency.
Expenditures to GDP: from the IMF World Economic Outlook as the general govern-
ment total expenditure as a percent of GDP (GGX_NGDP) at annual frequency.
Inflation: from the IMF World Economic Outlook as the annual percentages of average
consumer prices on year-on-year changes (PCPIPCH).
Current account to GDP: from the IMF World Economic Outlook as the annual cur-
rent account balance as a percent of GDP (BCA_NGDPD).
Openness: from the World Development Indicators as the sum of exports of goods and
services as % of GDP (NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS) with imports of goods and services as %
of GDP (NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS) at annual frequency.
Contagion: constructed as the average of the EMBI+ spreads across all countries, ex-
cluding the country of the observation, in a specific region (Latin America, Africa,
Europe, Asia).
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Rule of law: index from constructed by the World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Urban population: from the World Development Indicators as the urban population a
percentage of total population (SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS).
Haircut: estimates taken from Benjamin and Wright (2009) on per dollar creditor losses
on historical sovereign default episodes.
Section 4 uses data from Mexico to construct business cycle statistics. Data is taken, at
quarterly frequency, from Neumeyer and Perri (2005) for 1981 to 2001 and from OECD for
2002 to 2012. Debt and reserves uses instead data from the World Development Indicators
at an annual frequency. Moments are computed using de-trended series using an HP-filter
with a 1600 parameter. Consumption and income are expressed in logs. The default fre-
quency is taken from historical Mexican defaults identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) in
the last 2 centuries. Data for tax rates uses OECD Revenue Statistics - Comparative tables
following Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) methodology to compute effective average tax
rates on labor. In particular, the following variables are used:
GOS: Gross operating surplus and gross mixed income from OECD National Accounts
W: Compensation of employees from OECD National Accounts
1100: Income, profit and capital gains taxes of individuals from OECD Revenue Statistics
2000: Social security contributions from OECD Revenue Statistics
2200: Social security contributions of employers from OECD Revenue Statistics
3000: Payroll taxes from OECD Revenue Statistics
Using these variables, the two effective average tax rates are given by:
τh =
1100
GOS +W
τ l =
τh ·W + 2000 + 3000
W + 2200
Where τh is the personal income tax and τ lis the labor income tax, used to compute the
correlation with output.
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A.2 Two Period Model of Debt and Reserves
To better understand the intuition of the results presented in the main text a simple
two-period model is introduced. Due to its designed simplicity, this model isn’t adequate
to derive quantitative conclusions about the dynamics of the sovereign incentives to repay
debt. However, different aspects of the role of reserves in a model allowing for debt default
can be studied sequentially by assuming environments with different degrees of market
completeness or commitment to repay debt.
The model environment involves an agent that lives for two periods and that is endowed
with a certain income y1 in the first period and an uncertain income y2 in the second period
that can only take two outcomes yh > yl. Assume that p is the probability of receiving yh.
Lifetime utility from consuming c1 and c2 is given by:
W = c1 + βEu(c2) = c1 + βp · u(ch2) + β(1− p) · u(cl2) (20)
where u(c) is an utility function with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, and β is the discount coefficient.
Note that the agent is risk neutral in the first period while risk averse in the second.
This choice intends to capture, with a very simple specification, two distinct forces of
sovereign default models: agents wish to bring consumption from the future into the present
- captured by the coefficient β; agents wish to to smooth consumption emerging from
uncertainty - captured by the uncertain endowment and the second period utility function.
Complete Markets
For the complete markets case, it is assumed that the agent can issue debt contracts
with a risk-neutral external investor. Moreover, the agent can commit to repay his debts
to the external investor. Under this assumptions, the agent budget constraint becomes:
c1 = y1 + q
hDh + qlDl (21)
ci2 = y
i −Di, i = h, l (22)
where qh and ql are prices for debt contracts if, respectively, the high or low income state
of the world realize in period 2.
The typical solution for the maximization of (20), subject to (21) and (22) by choosing
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{Dh, Dl} is given by:
qh = βpu′(ch2)
ql = β(1− p)u′(cl2)
And, if the borrower is small compared to the external investor, then:
q¯ = βu′(c2) (23)
where q¯ = qh + ql is the risk free debt price (or equivalently the external investor discount
rate). Equations (23), (21) and (22) characterize the optimal allocation {c∗1, c∗2} as function
of β, q¯, yh, yl, p. Note that under complete markets consumption in the second period is
certain even when income isn’t. This occurs because debt contracts are contingent.
Incomplete Markets with Full Commitment
Suppose now that the agent only has access to non contingent debt contracts. His
becomes:
c1 = y1 + q¯D (24)
ci2 = y
i −D, i = h, l (25)
Note that now debt D has to be re-payed whether the agent receives a high or low endow-
ment. First order condition now implies
q¯ = βEu′(ci2) = β
[
pu′(ch2) + (1− p)u′(cl2)
]
(26)
The solution of equations (24), (25) and (26), gives now an optimal allocation {c∗1, ch∗2 , cl∗2 }
where ch∗2 > cl∗2 . That is, under incomplete markets the agent is not able to smooth
consumption in the second period.
Incomplete Markets without Full Commitment
With an option to repudiate debt, an agent with debt D decides to default in period
2 if the associated consumption is larger than what he would under repayment. Assuming
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that the losses of default imply an income given by:
y˜(y) =
yd,h if y = yhyd,l otherwise
Then, for some level of debt D:
cdef > crep ⇒ch,rep = yh −D > yd,h = ch,rep (27)
cl,rep = yl −D < yd,l = cl,rep (28)
This default choice implies that the price one unit of un-contingent debt is q = q¯p, so that
the consumer budget constraint becomes:
c1 = y1 + qD (29)
ch2 = y
h −D (30)
cl2 = y
d,l (31)
The first order condition and some algebra implies that q¯ = βu′(ch2), that together with (29),
(30) and (31) implies an allocation of consumption {c∗1, ch∗2 , cl∗2 } where ch∗2 > cl∗2 . Similarly
to the previous case, is not necessary that consumption can be completely smoothed in the
second period, irrespectively of the contingency that default allows.
Incomplete Markets with Reserves and without Full Commitment
Now the agent sees his contract choice expanded by reserves. The budget constraint is
now given by:
c1 = y1 + qD − q¯R
ch2 = y
h +R−D
cl2 = y
d,l +R
And the first order conditions by:
D : q = βpu′(ch2)⇔ q¯ = βu′(ch2) (32)
R : q¯ = β
[
pu′(ch2) + (1− p)u′(cl2)
]⇒ u′(ch2) = u′(cl2) (33)
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Implying an optimal allocation {c∗1, c∗2}. This result can be summarized in the following
claim.
Claim 1. (consumption smoothing) Under incomplete markets with reserves and without
full commitment, ch2 = cl2 = c2 is a solution for a given y˜(y) and β.
Proof. For a given D choose y˜(y) such that (27) and (28) hold. Given (32), such D can
be supported for a specific β. The rest of the proof follows directly from the first order
conditions.
This result shows that reserves and the ability to default allows the agent to perfectly
smooth consumption in the second period. In this sense, reserves are useful to complete
the market.
Claim 2. (demand for reserves and loss of default) Under incomplete markets with reserves
and without full commitment ∂R/∂yl,d < 0 for a given y˜(y) and β
Proof. This result follows from applying the implicit function theorem to (33) and claim 1:
q¯ = β
[
pu′(ch2) + (1− p)u′(cl2)
]
⇔ q¯ = β [q¯/β + (1− p)u′(yd,l +R)]
⇒ ∂R
∂yd,l
= −1 < 0
The result from claim 2 says that the demand for reserves is increasing with the output
loss. This gives the intuition why the full model adds counter-cyclical distortionary taxa-
tion: increasing taxes when the economy is in default further depresses the economy thus
increasing the usefulness of reserves in such events.
Reserves and Renegotiation
Consider that if the defaults in the second period, lenders make a one-shot offer of debt
restructuring by granting market access to the agent. That option grants the following
utility to the lender:
W d = u(c2) + A
where A is meant to capture in this simple framework all future benefits of regaining access
to international credit markets. The offer made an offer of a debt restructuring D˜ such
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that the agent is indifferent in accepting and rejecting the offer, that is:
u(y +R) = u(y +R− D˜) + A
That equation implicitly defines a recovery schedule D˜(y,R,A) ≤ D where D is the de-
faulted debt. The following result follows:
Claim 3. (recovery rate is increasing with reserves) ∂
(
D˜/D
)
/∂R ≥ 0
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that u′ < 0 and y +R ≥ y +R− D˜.
This result indicates that an agent is willing to transfer larger amounts of reserves to
lenders if there are gains of regaining market access.
A.3 Numerical computation
The computational algorithm is coded in Fortran and is similar to the one used in
Arellano (2008) or Yue (2010). For error tolerance v and ϕ, the algorithm steps follow the
below sequence:
1. Discretize space of D, R and the shock process z
2. Solve first for the value of permanent autarky vaut(R, z) using value function iteration:
(a) guess vaut,0(R, z)
(b) using vaut,0(R, z) solve for the maximization (14) to get vaut,1(R, z), using a non-
linear equation solver to determine the labor equilibrium in (15) and (16) and a
grid search method over the space of R
(c) evaluate ||vaut,1(R, z)− vaut,0(R, z)|; if it’s larger than v iterate on (a) using
vaut,0(R, z) := vaut,1(R, z) until converge
3. Guess the the recovery function ϕ0(D,R, z), and the value function vrep,0(D,R, z, s)
4. Use ϕ0(D,R, z) to update the value function to vrep,1(D,R, z, s) using a grid search
method over the space of (D,R):
(a) labor equilibrium in (11) and (12) is obtained using a non-linear equation solver
(b) vdef (D,R, z) by maximizing (13) using ϕ0(D,R, z) and vrep,0(D,R, z, s)
49
(c) debt price function is computed from the definition (9) using the functions
ϕ0(D,R, z), vrep,0(D,R, z, s) and vdef (D,R, z)
5. Evaluate ||vrep,1(D,R, z, s)− vrep,0(D,R, z, s)|; if it’s larger than v iterate on (4)
using vrep,0(D,R, z, s) := vrep,1(D,R, z, s) until converge
6. Using vrep,1(D,R, z, s), compute ϕ1(D,R, z) by solving (17) using a grid search method
over the space of D
7. Evaluate |ϕ1(D,R, z)− ϕ0(D,R, z)|; if it’s larger than v iterate on (3) using ϕ0(D,R, z) :=
ϕ1(D,R, z) until converge.
In the benchmark model, the state space of D and R is [0; 0.64] with 90 equally spaced
grid-points, that is, both debt and reserves share the same state space. The productivity
process log z is discretized with 21 grid points using the method proposed in Tauchen (1986)
with bounds given by a margin of 3.5 unconditional standard deviations with respect to
the mean. The maximum error allowed is ν = 10−6. The non-linear equation solver to
determine labor equilibrium uses Brent’s method.
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A.4 Simulation results for alternative specifications of the model
This section shows the simulation results from using alternative specifications of the
model using the parameter values from table 4.
Table 8: Alternative model specifications
Data Baseline G = 0 No Dist CRRA No SS No Ren
mean(D/Y ) 32 34 51 49 32 33 5
stdev(TB/Y ) 1.4 1.3 2.6 2.8 1.8 1.3 0.9
stdev(y) 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
mean(Drecover/D) 58 55 50 56 56 53 0
mean(G/Y ) 20 20 0 20 20 20 20
mean(R/Y ) 9 10 3 5 5 7 0
mean(ispread) 3.0 1.4 2.4 2.5 2.7 0.4 7.7
stdev(ispread) 1.5 1.3 2.4 2.9 2.9 1 16.8
stdev(c)/stdev(y) 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.2
corr(y, c) 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.83 0.91 0.97 0.97
corr(y, ispread) -0.56 -0.26 -0.45 -0.36 -0.42 -0.37 -0.49
corr(TB/Y, y) -0.66 -0.66 -0.69 -0.4 -0.46 -0.69 -0.56
corr(τ, y) -0.49 -0.81 -0.69 - 0.76 -0.82 -0.78
default rate 2.0 2.8 4.1 4.8 5.2 0.8 8.2
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